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Trade Reform, Policy Uncertainty, and the Current Account:
A Non-Expected-Utility Approach
B}' Sw'ED[R VAN WIJNBHRG[N'
Rapid and comprchensivc rcduction in
barricrs to intcrnational tradc has oftcn
bcen followed by a sharp deterioration in
thc currcnt account (Rudigcr pornbusch,
1987; Dani Rodrik, 1990).' The steep,
59 billion deterioration in Mexico's current
account during the two years after the
trade-reform process was accelerated in
1987 is only the most reccnt examplc. Thc
macroeconomic counterpart of the deterio-
ration has typically been a decline in private
savings; no clear response pattern has been
observed for private investment. Economic
theory has in recent years reachcd clear
conclusions on these matters; the problem
with these conclusions is that they seem
counter(actual.
The problem dces not really reside with
investment. The investment response will
depend on relative capital intensity of the
industry whosc protcction is rcmovcd com-
pared to the sectors favored by trade liber-
alization. Putty-clay considerations would
tend to strengthen the investment response,
as old capital gets scrapped more quickly in
response to changing relative prices. On the
othcr hand, policy uncertainty bestows an
option value on assets more liquid than
physical capital (van Wijnbergen, 1985) and
thus tends to depress investment. However,
with no clear prediction emerging from eco-
' Dcvelupment Research DepanmenL Wurld Bank,
ININ H Street. N.W., Washíngton DC 21k3], and
CE.PR. 6 Duke of York Street, Lundun SWIY 6LA,
U.K. 1 am indrbted to Patricio Arrau and Ravi Kanbur
fur helpful discussiuns. The upinions expresud in Ihis
paprr du not necessarily toincide with Ihose uf Ihe
mstitutions with which 1 am affilialed.
~Durnbuuh IIYt471 makes Ihe poínl in a di(Eerenl
cuntrxt~. he argurs that an inerease in tarilts wuuld
improve the U.S. current accuunt. By symmetry (nut an
inmKUOUS a..umptiun), Ihis suppurls Ihe vicw Ihat a
drereate wuuld drteriurate the current accuunt.
nomic theory, the ambiguous empirical
record on this score is only to be expected.
The situation is difïcrcnt with savings. In
an elegant analysis, Assaf Razin and Lars
Svensson U983) pointed out that a perma-
ncnt reduction in tarifís affccts currcnt and
future goods in the same way, leaving in-
tertemporal rclative prices and private sav-
ings unchangcd. Gradual tariff reduction in
fact raiscs the price of current goods in
terms of future goods and would thus tend
to improve private savings (Sebastian Ed-
wards and van Wijnbergen (1986) make a
case (or gradualism in thc presence of capi-
tal-market imperfections on this basis). It is
this body o[ theory that, for all its theoreti-
cal elegance, seems firmly at variance with
the facts.
This paper starts from the observation
that anticipated policy reversal may explain
a declinc in private savings for the same
reason gradual tariff reduction causes pri-
vate savings to go up. Temporarily low tar-
ifís lower the relative price of current goods
in terms of luture goods and thus tend to
depress private savings.
However, the possibility of policy reversal
does more than skew intertemporal relative
prices toward today rather than tomorrow;
it also increases policy uncertainty per se. ls
it possible that this increase in uncertainty
reinforces the private-savings impact of an
anticipated reversal of trade re(orm? This
cannot really be analyzed in the standard
expected-utility framework because risk
aversion and intertemporal substitution, two
very different attributes of consumer prefer-
ences, are arbitrarily confined to be in-
vcrsely related in that framework. 1 show
that, in the context of impcrfectly credible
trade reform, this inverse rclation implies
Ihat policy uncertainty is unimportant when
it would reducc privatc savings and, when
AIM1
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important, would tend to increase private
savings.
This conclusion depends entirely on the
inverse rclation between risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution elasticity im-
posed arbitrarily by the framework of ex-
pected-utility maximization. The "ordinal
certainty equivalence" (OCE) approach in-
troduced by Larry Selden (1978) offers a
way out of the straitjacket imposed by ex-
pected-utility maximization. The OCE ap-
proach allows independent parametrization
of risk aversion and intertemporal substitu-
tion. Within the OCE framework, 1 show
that, with positive risk aversion, policy un-
certainty will in fact reinforce the negative
savings impact of an anticipated policy re-
versal, espccially when that negative impact
is strong. This suggests that with high risk
aversion and high intertemporal substitu-
tion, a rapid trade reform that is not (ully
credihle may depress private savings signif-
icantly, with attendant negative impact on
the current account. This conclusion seems
to accord well with actual experience.
1. The Model
There are two periods, 0 and 1. Thus, the
time-consistency problems that naive appli-
cations of the OCE approach lead to in
multiperiod settings (cf. Philippe Wcil, 1990)
do not arise. Consumers consume home and
foreign goods in each period. The home
good is chosen as numcraire, and the exoae-
nous world relative price of the foreign good
in terms of the home good is normalized to
1. There is no tariff in period 0; it is the
beginning of a period o( complete trade
liberalization. However, .rr, the probability
that the old tari(f (r, - 1) will be restored in
the next period, is larger than zero. Thus,
the future local price of the foreígn good,
T„ follows a binomial distrihution:
( I) Tt ~ 1 with probahility 1- a.
r, with probahility ~rr
To simplify the structure of income ef-
fects, assume that consumers have no
within-period income, just wealth at the be-
ginning of period 0, ff',,. Wealth is spent
today or tomorrow, and within each period,
on home goods h and imports m. Wealth
not spent in period 0 earns a certain rate of
return R ( the world rate of interest) be-
tween period 0 and l.
1 assume homothetic, unit-elastic prefer-
ences across goods within a time period.Z
Consumers know the within-period tariff at
the beginning of the period, before allcxat-
ing expenditure over home and foreign
goods. One can therefore define real con-
sumption expenditure C, and the associated
dual price index p, as
(2) Ct - (hi t miTt)~Pt
Pt -Ti.
(an asterisk indicates an optimally chosen
quantity). C„ is defined similarly. By as-
sumption, the period-0 tariff is zero: T„ a l.
The budget share of foreign goods in each
period, a, is constant because of the as-
sumption of a unitary within-period substi-
tution elasticity. Under these assumptions,
the within-period budget identities are
(3) W, - 0 pC, - W,
Wi -(W~-C„)R.
The consumer choice problem presented
here involves both intertemporal choice for
given intertemporal prices and response to
risk. The standard expectcd-utility frame-
work is unsatisfac[ory for this prohlcm, he-
cause risk aversion and intertemporal sub-
stitution, two very different attributes o(
consumer preferences, are necessarily in-
versely related in that framework. This fol-
lows from the controversial assumption,
made axiomatically, of comumer intliffer-
ence with respect to the timing of resolution
of uncertainty atwut consumption lotteries
(cf. Larry Epstein and Stanlcy Zin, 192t9;
Weil, 1990).
~The assumptiun o( unit imratemp~~rnl rlr.u.ity i.
made to simplify the expression (or the c~act pen~ul-I
conxumer price index and the consumptinn ratr of
interest- Qualitatively similar rewlts wouW cnme nut
with any poxttive inlratemporal suhsutution elast~ciry.
n~R 711li AAIFHI('AN F(~U,vonuc rrr.~wr:n' JUn'c lvv.
I usr thc "ordinal certainty equivalence"
framcwurk 15cldcn, 1978) to discntanglc risk
aversion and intertemporal substitution.
Undcr this approach, utility is dcfined ovcr
lhc ccrtain pcriod-U cunsumptiun Icvcl and
a ccrtainty-cquivalcnt mcasurc of thc unccr-
tain pcriud-I cunsumptiun Icvcl. This utility
functiun is charactcrizcd by an intcrtcmpo-
ral suhstitution clasticity Q- l ~p. Thc cer-
tainty eyuivalcnt of periud-1 consumption is
bascd un risk aversion parametrizcd by the
cocfficicnt of rclativc risk aversion, y, which
is assumcd tu be strictly positive. This re-




C~ R,~ can bc intcrprctcd as thc ccrtainty
cyuivalent of thc unccrtain pcriud-1 aggrc-
gatc cunsumptiun level, with y as thc rcle-
vant risk-avcrsion parameter. Using (Z) and
(3), onc can dcrive a simplificd expression
for Ci:
Ti.
(5) ff~u-Cof( R )CI
C, R
- CII } - RCRI - a
RcRI T,
~C1 - RcRr( Wn- Cu)-
RcRr is the ex posr consumption rate of
interesr the terms on which consumption
tuday can be substituted for consumption
tomorrow. Since T, is stochastic, Rc.RI is
stuchastic tuo; define Rr, the risk-adjusted
consumption ratc of intcrest, as Ihe ex anrc
ccrtainty equivalcnt of Rc.R,:
(6) Rr-(L'l1cRl)I-r





Maximizing V as defined in equation (4)
subject to the budget constraints (3) and
using equation (7) yields thc following for
period-0 consumption, C,,:
1
(g) Co - 1 f A
W".
That is, period-0 consumption is propor-
tiunal to wcalth. The proporlionality factor
I ~( I t A) depcnds on the risk-adjustcd rate
of interest Rr, the subjective timc-prefer-




Trade-policy reversal thus afíects private
consumption in pcriud 0 entircly thruugh its
impact on the risk-adjusted consumption
rate of interest, Rr. An increasc in this rate
afïects pcriod-0 consumption:
(lo) dCa~-
f zl A 1 1)-pldRr (1 t A) 1 Rr P
:w(P-f) Ip~O.
If the intertcmporal substitution is larger
than I(p C 1), a higher risk-adjusted con-
sumption rate of intcrest depresses private
consumptiun.
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II. Trade Reform, Future Policy Reversal,
and Private Savings
Since all the effects o! potential policy
reversals work through the risk-adjusted
consumption rate of interest, I first calcu-
late this rate for the binomial distribution
over future tariff rates of equation (1):
( I R 1 I-r l 1-r
(11) R,alEl Tal 1l ` I
U-r)- 1-rz R~1 f ~rrÍtt " 1~~ .
Obviously, for y z 0 this rate equals the
expected rate:
(12) Rr-o-(1-.rr)Rtar~oR
- R[~rr(t~a- 1) f 1].
It is instructive to separate the effect of
potential future tariff increases through their
impact on the expected consumption rate of
interest from their impact on savings
through increasing the variance of the con-
sumption rate of interest. I therefore
cxamine the case of a fully anticipated
trade-policy reversal first, before introduc-
ing uncertainry about it in the next subsec-
tion.
A. Antieipated Future Trade-Poliey
Ret~ersal and Priuate Sae~ings
With full anticipation (a - 1), the risk-
adjusted rate of interest Rr collapses into
the expected rate !or ,r - 1:
~I-ri- I-r(13) Rr-R~lt(tia 1~~
From (13), one can derive the impact of a
fully anticipated trade-policy reversal
(higher future tariffs) on Rr:
(14) aRr a -aRt~ tt'"i
I
Equation (14) establishes the first point of
this paper. an anticipated trade-policy re-
versal (i.e., an anticipation that futurc tariffs
will exceed current tarif~s) lowers the risk-
adjusted consumption rate of interest. Com-
bining (10) and (14) then indicates how an
anticipated trade-liberalization reversal
(higher future tariffs) affects current con-
sumption:
(is) a~o~laRrlld~lr~
a - rG(P - 1)aRr~
ii.ol
1
~ 0 if and only if -~ 1.
P
Equation (15) establishes the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1(IT Effect): An antici-
pated rollhack of trade liberalizarion leads to
an increase rn current consumption (a decline
in pnuate sarings) ij the intertemporal substi-
tution elasticiry exceeds 1(p c 11.~
B. Prie~ate Sarings and Uncertainty
about Future Trade Policy
Does uncertainty about future trade pol-
icy per se, for any given expected value of
future tariffs," have an impact on period-0
consumption? Such an effect would open up
a second channel through which a trade
reform with less than complete credihiliry
could affect private savings. This could bc
assessed by manipulating ~rr and ri so as to
~The impan on savings wdl be uncundiuunully nrg-
alive d eonsumers amicipa~e thr income ettrc~s uf a
period-1 rebate ot lariff revenues-
'Or, more precisely, (or any given etipecied valuc o(
Ihe consumption discoum rate.
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increase the variance for given expected
value of the future dual price index, p~.
However, the particular structure of the
modcl is such that this approach is a diffi-
cult route toward establishing the link be-
tween trade-policy uncertainry and private
savings. Thc first problem is that an in-
crease in the variance of the expected con-
sumption rate of interest that preserves the
mean would imply a complicated nonlinear
restriction on ti and a[it requires keeping
expression (12) constant]. The second prob-
lem is more serious, since i[ is more than
just a technical complication that could in
principle be dealt with like the first. The
problem is that the relation between the
variance and ~r is quadratic under the bino-
mial assumption made in equation (1) and
has an interiur maximum (the variance is
proportional to a[1 - xr]). This relation can
thus not be inverted to write RY as a func-
tion of the variance rather than o! a itself.
Different values of rr can yield the same
variance of the expected consumption rate
of interest, so there is no way .rr can be
substituted out of the expression for RY to
write Rr as a function of the variance in-
stead. Moreover, changes in ~rr will have
effects on the variance of the expected rate
of interest that differ in their sign depend-
ing on the initial value from which .rr is
changing. I therefore foltow a different ap-
proach.
In the OCE framework, assuming y- 0
eliminates all impact of uncertainty, obvi-
ously without any impact on the expecred
consumption rate of interest. Thus, an anal-
ysis of the case for y~ 0 isolates the pure
expected reversal effect, with no pollution
by uncertainty per se. The impact o( uncer-
tainty can then be assessed by looking at the
impact of increasing y. Increasing y leaves
the expected consumption discount rate un-
affected, since it only involves a change in
preferences, not in the objective environ-
ment. It therefore dces not have any effect
on the impact of an expecred reversal anal-
ysed in Subsection 11-A; in the OCE ap-
proach, risk aversion and intertemporal sub-
l U,VE I QY:
been increased. Finally, sincc the only un-
certainty in the model is the uncertainty
related to future tarifís, the entire impact of
the increase in y is due to the existing
uncertainty about future trade policy. The
impact of an increase in y would be zero if
there were no tariff uncertainty.
Consider how an increase in y would
affect period-0 consumption given the
stochastic structure outlined in (9). Once
again, the entire impact of both uncertainty
and of increases in y runs through the
impact on the risk-adjusted interest rate.
Thus, consider the derivative of RY with
respect to y. To this end, 1 introduce some
simplifying notation. Define first the con-
sumption discount rate in case of a zero
future tariff as RH, and in the case of a
positive future tariff as R~. Also, define k
as k L 1- y. Thís yields
(16) RY~~rrR~t(1-rr)RFi~~ik
-(ERk)~~k i-L,H.
E is the expectations operator over the dís-
tribution specified in equation ( 1). Taking
logs and bringing k to the other side yields
(17) k log Ry ~ log( ERk ~.
Log-differentiation yields
k r dRr l E[ Rk log( R,)]
(fg) (R )I dk
ItIogRYs R(Rk) .
r





- E[R` Io6( R' )J - E( Rk )~og( LcR,` )
~ 0.
stitution can be separated. Therefore, the The inequality in (19) obtains because of
impact of increasing y from 0 is the impact convexity of the function f(z)- z log(z).
of uncertainty at the value to which y has Since k- 1 - y, equation (19) establishes
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for all y.
Thus, introducing risk aversion in the
presence of uncertainty about future trade
reform will unambiguously lower the risk-
adjusted consumption rate of interest,
something that it would not have done with-
out the trade-related uncertainry (since
there is no other source of uncertainty).
One can therefore conclude that uncer-
tainty about future trade-policy reversal will
lower the risk-adjusted consumption rate of
interest. However, (10) states that a cut in
tho risk-adjusted rate of interest will de-
press private savings if the intertemporal
substitution elasticity is larger than 1(p c 1).
Thus, combining equations (10) and (20)
yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2 (Uncertainty Effect): Un-
certainry obout furure trade policy per se (i.e.,
for giuen expected ualue of the tarifj) will
increase priuate consumption today if the
inrertemporal rate of substirution exceeds 1
(p ~ 1).
Thus, under the OCE approach, the in-
tertemporal substitution effect (1S) of
Proposition 1 reinforces the uncertainty ef-
fect (UE) of Proposition 2 for all values of
p. If intertemporal substitution is high (p ~
1),: both the IS effect and the UE effect
increase private consumption; if intertem-
poral substitution is low (p~ 1), both de-
press private consumption. Moreover, this
holds for all values of the risk-aversion pa-
rameter y. This contrasts with the expected-
utility approach, in which the two effects
reinforce each other only when y ~ 1(i.e.,
when uncertainty is relatively unimportant
because risk aversion is low).
111. Conclusions
This paper starts from the observation
that trade liheralization is often followed by
sThis result is a special case of a general proposition
in Pcler Diamund and Joseph Soghtz (1974).
a strong surge of imports and an accom-
panying current-account deterioration. The
macroeconomic counterpart of this deterio-
ration is typically a decline in savings rather
than an investment boom. I show first of all
that anticipation of reimposition of tariffs in
the future lowers the expected consumption
rate of interest ( makes current goods
cheaper in terms of future goods). There-
fore, an anticipated future tariff increase
will increase current consumption if the in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity is larger
than 1. If consumers internalize the impact
of future tariff revenues on their after-tax
income, the savings impact will always be
negative, even for an intertemporal substi-
tution elasticity below 1.
The second result concerns the impact of
policy uncertainty per se on private savings.
1 separate the impact of expecred shifts in
intertemporal relative prices (rom risk aver-
sion by using the ordinal-certainty-equiv-
alence approach pioneered by Selden (1978),
and, for infinite horizons, by Epstein and
Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). This approach
relaxes the rigid inverse relationship be-
tween intertemporal substitution and risk
aversion that characterizes the expected-
utility approach to consumer choice under
uncertainty. Within the OCE framework, 1
establish that policy uncertainty per se will
further reduce private savings if (a) there is
positive risk aversion and (b) the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity exceeds I.
This is an interesting result for two rea-
sons. First it shows how policy uncertainty
about future tariffs will reinforce the nega-
tive savings impact of the direct anticipated
reversal effect exactly when the latter is
large ( intertemporal substitution elasticity is
high). The two effects will thus be in the
same direction exactly when they matter
most. The second observation is more aca-
demic. In the standard expected-utility ap-
proach, risk aversion is low when inter-
temporal substitution is high, because the
relevant elasticities are each other's inverse.
The consequence of this is that whenever
the uncertainty effect is important, the di-
rect anticipation effect is no[ and vice versa.
This result is reversed in the non-expected-
utili[y approach: the two effects are comple-
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mentary in the case where the direct antici-
pation efTect is important.
How relevant is all this from an empirical
point of view? There is after all a widely
held belief that the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity is very low (p very high), with
some economists setting p as high as around
10 (Robert Hall, 1988). More recent evi-
dence using the approach of Epstein and
"Lin (1989) to consumer choice under uncer-
lainty has tended to come up with difierent
results, however. Most relevant in this case
are the results reported for Mexico in
Patricio Arrau and van Wijnbergen (1991)
and Gil Bufman et aL (1991), since Mexico's
experience with trade reform was in Cact
what triggered this paper.
Arrau and van Wijnbergen (1991) and
Butman et aL (1991) find values for p be-
tween 0.24 and 0.8, depending on whether
or not money services are accounted for in
the measure of consumption, indicating a
substitution elasticity well in excess of I.
With money servíces incorporated, the im-
plicit estimate of the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity is 4.2, significantly in excess of
l. Similar results are reported by Epstein
and Zin (1991) for the United States.
Whether the channels explored in this pa-
per were in fact behind the sharp deteriora-
tion in the trade balance that followed
Mexico's trade reforms requires a more in-
depth analysis than the evidence just men-
tioned, but the empirical results suggest that
the channels explored in this paper could
conceivably have played an important role.
These results have important policy im-
plications. If the trade reform will not be
reversed, but the government cannot credi-
bly communicate that to the private sector,
consumers effectivcly trade ofi the wrong
intertemporal prices. As a consequence, pri-
vate savings will be suboptimally low; this
justifies policy intervention to increase pri-
vate savings. This is a spccial case of a more
general point made by Guillermo A. Calvo
and Carlos A. Vegh (1990): mistaken beliefs
about future policy act like a distortion and
therefore justify policy intervention in prin-
ciple. Increasing private savings should
prcferably be done lhrough a temporary
increase in consumption taxes. If that is not
1 UNF 1 uv.
feasible, a case can be made for temporary
tariffs as a second-best response; this would
be equivalent to gradual rather than "cold
turkey" trade liberalization.
A magnifying impact could come about if
the private-savings response leads to such a
large current-account deficit that the trade
reform itself dces in fact get reversed, a
case of sel(-fulfilling prophccy.b This very
real possibility further strengthens the case
for policy intervenlion to increase private
savings and, arguably, for external support
in the early periods of trade re(orm, possi-
bly [hrough institutions like the World Bank.
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